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INTRODUCTION
Internet domain name registration has become a hot issue over
the last few years. It has been the subject of much litigation and
was a reason why Congress substantially amended federal
269
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trademark statutes thrice in four years.1 This Article will discuss
the most recent federal statute concerning Internet domain name
registration and will provide both federal appellate and district
court cases that have interpreted and applied this new law. This
Article will also attempt to note the changes that this new statute
has made, as well as the similarities and differences between the
new law and traditional trademark law that has been previously
applied.
I. THE MOST RECENT LAW
On November 29, 1999, Congress enacted the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).2 The
ACPA was the first federal statute enacted to specifically address
problems associated with Internet domain name disputes. It has
become a powerful tool for owners of protected marks.3 This law
made it illegal “for a person to register or to use with the ‘bad
faith’ intent to profit from an Internet domain name that is
‘identical or confusingly similar’ to the distinctive or famous
trademark or Internet domain name of another person or
company.”4 The language of the ACPA serves as a method for
trademark owners to obtain control of domain names prior to the
commencement of litigation.5
1

See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat.
985, 985–86 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)); Trademark
Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-43, §§ 3(a)(2), 5, 113 Stat. 219, 220 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3), (c)(2)); Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000(a), 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A545–49) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)).
2
Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1501, 1536 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1125(d)).
3
See Elizabeth Robison Martin, “Too Famous to Live Long!” The Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act Sets Its Sights to Eliminate Cybersquatter Opportunistic Claims
on Domain Names, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 797, 832 (2000).
4
Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)).
5
This can be accomplished by the use of what are commonly known as ACPA “ceaseand-desist” letters. These letters, usually sent by attorneys of protected mark holders,
were around prior to the enactment of the ACPA. The ACPA’s language, however, has
been specifically incorporated into cease-and-desist letters sent to potential
cybersquatters, thus providing a strong means of obtaining ownership of a domain name
without the need for litigation. For an example of a post-ACPA cease-and-desist letter,
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Congress designed the ACPA to deter the misuse of domain
name registration.6 Specifically stated, Congress intended
to protect consumers and American businesses, to promote
the growth of online commerce, and to provide clarity in
the law for trademark owners by prohibiting the bad-faith
and abusive registration of distinctive marks as Internet
domain names with the intent to profit from the goodwill
associated with such marks—a practice commonly referred
to as “cybersquatting.”7
In other words, in “the typical situation that the ACPA seeks to
address, individuals register domain names that consist of famous
trademarks and then attempt to sell (or perhaps more accurately, to
ransom) those domain names to the trademark owners, thereby
profiting from the goodwill associated with the trademark.”8 The
goal behind the ACPA is to control problems associated with
cybersquatters. Cybersquatters have been described as those who
register “a trademark as a domain name with the intent of profiting
from it by selling it, usually to the trademark owner.”9 Although it
does not provide absolute protection to protected marks, the ACPA

see Richard Keyt, Sample Cease & Desist Letter to Send to a Domain Name Owner
Whose Domain Name is Infringing on a Trademark, KeytLaw, at
http://www.keytlaw.com/urls/c&d.htm (last modified Dec. 14, 2001).
6
See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 9 (1999); CNN v. cnnews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506
(E.D. Va. 2001) (stating that the “ACPA’s purpose is made manifest in its title: it is
designed to deter, prohibit and remedy ‘cyberpiracy,’ which is defined in the legislative
history as the bad faith registration or use of a domain name”) (citations omitted).
7
S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4.
8
Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 880 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
9
Monica Kilian, Cybersquatting and Trademark Infringement, 7 E LAW—MURDOCH
UNIV. ELECS. J. OF L. 26, ¶ 11 (Sept. 2000), at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/
issues/v7n3/kilian73.html. It should be noted that the Senate Report for the ACPA
described “cybersquatting” as “the deliberate, bad-faith, and abusive registration of
Internet domain names in violation of trademark owners.” S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4.
This definition may be too constrictive. See also Jonathan M. Eisenberg, A Guide to the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, J. INTERNET L. 2, ¶ 1 (Mar. 2000)
(identifying a “quintessential cybersquatter [as] the person who, for about $70, is first to
register the Internet domain name of a well-known company or trademark . . . and then
tries to ransom the domain name back to the hapless company or trademark holder”), at
http://www.gcwf.com/articles/ journal/jil_march00_1.html.
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does provide a remedy for any “bad faith appropriation of the
mark.”10 The ACPA also protects consumers.11
The law is as follows:
(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner
of a mark, including a personal name which is protected as
a mark under this section, if, without regard to the goods or
services of the parties, that person
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark,
including a personal name which is protected as a mark
under this section; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that—
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the
time of registration of the domain name, is identical
or confusingly similar to that mark;
10

Serena C. Hunn, AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act: A Powerful Remedy
in Domain Name Disputes? Or a Threat to Electronic Commerce (stating that the “bill
does not provide blanket protection to the trademark owner or owner of a personal name
protected as a mark, rather it provides a remedy against the ‘bad faith’ appropriation of
the mark”), at http://www.fmew.com/archive/cybersquat (last modified Aug. 2000) ; see
also BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 511 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (“Congress clearly intended to use the bad faith element of the statute as a way to
narrow the breath of the statute.”).
11
See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 5.
The practice of cybersquatting harms consumers, electronic commerce, and the
goodwill equity of valuable U.S. brand names, upon which consumers
increasingly rely to locate the true source of genuine goods and services on the
Internet. Online consumers have a difficult time distinguishing a genuine site
from a pirate site, given that often the only indications of source and
authenticity of the site, or the goods and services made available thereon, are
the graphical interface on the site itself and the Internet address at which it
resides. As a result, consumers have come to rely heavily on familiar brand
names when engaging in online commerce. But if someone is operating a web
site under another brand owner’s trademark, such as a site called
“cocacola.com” or “levis.com,” consumers bear a significant risk of being
deceived and defrauded, or at a minimum, confused. The costs associated with
these risks are increasingly burdensome as more people begin selling
pharmaceuticals, financial services, and even groceries over the Internet.
Regardless of what is being sold, the result of online brand name abuse, as with
other forms of trademark violations, is the erosion of consumer confidence in
brand name identifiers and in electronic commerce generally.
Id.
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(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at
the time of registration of the domain name, is
identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that
mark; or
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by
reason of section 706 of title 18, United States
Code, or section 220506 of title 36, United States
Code.
(B)
(i) In determining whether a person has a bad faith
intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may
consider factors such as, but not limited to
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property
rights of the person, if any, in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of
the legal name of the person or a name that is
otherwise commonly used to identify that person;
(III) the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain
name in connection with the bona fide offering of
any goods or services;
(IV) the person’s bona fide noncommercial or fair
use of the mark in a site accessible under the
domain name;
(V) the person’s intent to divert consumers from the
mark owner’s online location to a site accessible
under the domain name that could harm the
goodwill represented by the mark, either for
commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or
disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of
confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation,
or endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise
assign the domain name to the mark owner or any
third party for financial gain without having used,

273
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or having an intent to use, the domain name in the
bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the
person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such
conduct;
(VII) the person’s provision of material and
misleading false contact information when applying
for the registration of the domain name, the
person’s intentional failure to maintain accurate
contact information, or the person’s prior conduct
indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person’s registration or acquisition of
multiple domain names which the person knows are
identical or confusingly similar to marks of others
that are distinctive at the time of registration of such
domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of
others that are famous at the time of registration of
such domain names, without regard to the goods or
services of the parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in
the person’s domain name registration is or is not
distinctive and famous within the meaning of
subsection (c)(1) of section 43.12
The mere registration of a domain that may be similar to a
famous trademark name is insufficient for a showing of “bad faith
intent to profit” as required under the ACPA.13 Bad faith intent to
profit requires that there be a standard used to determine the
mental state of the registrant. The factors delineated above in 15
U.S.C. § 1125(d)(B)(i) serve as a basis for courts to make a
determination of whether such a state of mind exists, but courts are
not confined to these factors in their analysis.14 Because courts are
12

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1) (2000).
See Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir.
2001).
14
See Gregory B. Blasbalg, Comment, Masters of Their Domains: Trademark Holders
Now Have New Ways to Control Their Marks in Cyberspace, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 563, 569–70 (2000) (noting that “these factors are simply guidelines, not an allinclusive list of factors to be used by the courts”).
13
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not limited to these statutory factors, the ACPA affords courts
sufficient discretion.15
The ACPA also sets forth a complete defense for registrants
alleged to have violated the ACPA. Consistent with principles of
trademark and other intellectual property law, the ACPA provides
a complete “fair use” defense to domain name registration.16 The
ACPA states that bad faith intent “shall not be found in any case in
which the court determines that the person believed and had
reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was
a fair use or otherwise lawful.”17
As noted, the ACPA’s purpose is to combat and control the evil
cybersquatter. Congress enacted the ACPA to clarify trademark
owners’ rights, to provide remedies for mark owners subjected to
abusive domain name registration practices, and to deter this type
of behavior.18 The Senate, in its report on the ACPA, pinpointed
the types of behavior that it intended to deter.19 The Senate
recognized that the following behavior needed to be addressed:
• the securing and locking up of domain names with
the intent to “ransom” these domain names off for a
huge profit, whether the profit be from the owner of
the protected mark, or anyone else who just happens
to be the highest bidder;

15

•

the “preying” on Internet surfer confusions “by
misusing a domain name to divert customers from
the mark owner’s site” to another site;

•

those in direct competition with owners of a
protected mark who register a domain name first;

See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 10 (“Courts must ultimately weigh the facts of each case
and make a determination based on those facts whether or not the defendant registered,
trafficked in, or used the domain name with bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill of
the mark of another.”).
16
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).
17
Id.
18
See S. REP. NO. 106-140.
19
See id., at 5–7.
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•

behavior that involves those who “target distinctive
marks to defraud consumers, including to engage in
counterfeiting activities.”20

Congress found that cyberpiracy and its effects result “in consumer
fraud and public confusion as to the true source or sponsorship of
goods and services; impairs electronic commerce . . . ; deprives
legitimate trademark owners of substantial revenue and consumer
goodwill; and places unreasonable, intolerable, and overwhelming
burdens on trademark owners in protecting their valuable marks.”21
The goals of the ACPA demonstrate that “Congress harbors an
aversion to cybersquatters.”22 In creating the ACPA to deter this
behavior, members of Congress believed that they had drafted an
effective and equitable law. Senator Orrin Hatch, a leading
proponent of the ACPA, stated that it “balances the property
interests of trademark owners with the interests of Internet users
who would make fair use of others’ marks or otherwise engage in
protected speech online.”23
Prior to the ACPA’s enactment, courts utilized traditional
trademark law principles to resolve domain name disputes.24 The
20

See id.
Id.
22
See, e.g., Oliver R. Gutierrez, Get Off My URL! Congress Outlaws Cybersquatting in
the Wild West of the Internet, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 139, 166
(2000) (citing 145 CONG. REC. S14986, 15019 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1999) and 145 CONG.
REC. S7325, 7335 (daily ed. July 29, 1999)).
23
S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 9.
24
See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999);
Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1999); Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t, Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999);
Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Data Concepts, Inc. v.
Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 1998); Shades Landing, Inc. v. Williams,
76 F. Supp. 2d 983 (D. Minn. 1999); CCBN.com, Inc., v. C-call.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d
106 (D. Mass. 1999); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc. 66 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass.
1999); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998); Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Juno Online Servs.,
L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Cardservice Int’l, Inc. v.
McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1997); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp.
1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996); MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Blasbalg, supra note 14, at 566 (“Before the enactment of the ACPA the most successful
remedy available to the victims of cybersquatting was the use of federal trademark
law.”).
21
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two most common legal theories advanced for resolving these
disputes were trademark infringement and trademark dilution.
Traditional trademark infringement law seeks to protect both
marks and consumers from the use of protected marks in
commerce in a manner that causes general public confusion, a
“likelihood of confusion,” or deception.25 Traditional trademark
dilution, recently codified in 1996,26 seeks to prevent commercial
use of protected marks when that use diminishes the distinctive
quality of the marks.27 The ACPA demonstrates a connection with
traditional principles, as well as an evolution of the law. Indeed,
the ultimate goal of traditional trademark law—of striking a
balance between the protections afforded to the owner of a mark
and the fair use of that mark—resembles Senator Hatch’s intent
when creating the ACPA.28
Although it is based on traditional trademark principles,29 the
ACPA is narrowly tailored to deal with problems arising from
domain name disputes. One major difference between traditional
trademark law and the ACPA, for example, is that the ACPA does
not require that the domain name at issue be used in commerce.
The ACPA applies to all domain names registered, trafficked in, or
used, regardless of whether the names are intended for commercial
purposes.30 Traditional trademark infringement and dilution,
codified in the Lanham Act,31 require that marks be used in
commerce for a trademark claim to exist.32 Additionally, the
ACPA provides remedies for domain names that are “confusingly

25

15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)–1127 (2000); see also Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d at 873.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
27
See id.
28
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
29
See, e.g., Neil L. Martin, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act:
Empowering Trademark Owners, But Not the Last Word on Domain Name Disputes, 25
IOWA J. CORP. L. 591, 596 (2000) (stating that “the structure of the ACPA triggers a
trademark infringement analysis”).
30
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii).
31
Id. § 1051.
32
See id. § 1125(a)(1) (stating that any “person who, on or in connection with any
goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof”).
26
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similar” to marks,33 which is a departure from the former
likelihood of confusion test.34
Under the ACPA, a plaintiff must prove three key elements.
First, the plaintiff must show that the mark embodied within the
text of the domain name is either distinctive or famous.35 Second,
after this classification is determined, the plaintiff must show that
the domain name is identical, confusingly similar, or dilutive of a
protective mark.36 Third, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant possessed a bad faith intent to profit when registering
the protected mark as a domain name.37 If the plaintiff proves
these elements, then a court may “order the forfeiture or
cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain
name to the owner of the mark.”38 When a personal name, rather
than a trademarked term, is the subject of the domain name
dispute, federal trademark law requires a showing that the
registrant possessed “specific intent to profit”;39 however, case law
33

Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I).
See id. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (noting that infringement may exist when a protected mark is
issued in a manner that “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
by another person”).
35
See Jason H. Kaplan, Comment, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act:
Will It End the Reign of the Cybersquatter?, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 43, 54 (2000) (stating
that under the “ACPA, the level of distinctiveness or fame controls the level of protection
the mark receives”).
36
See Cello Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence-Dahl Cos., 89 F. Supp. 2d 464, 472
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that the ACPA “distinguishes between a ‘distinctive’ mark and a
‘famous’ mark. Liability is imposed with respect to a ‘distinctive’ mark if the domain
name is ‘identical or confusingly similar.’ Liability is imposed with respect to a ‘famous’
mark if the domain name is ‘identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark.’”)
(citations omitted).
37
See, e.g., Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Jennifer Mae
Slonaker, Comment, Conflicting Interpretations of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
Create Inadequate Famous Mark Protection, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 121, 134 (2000).
38
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C).
39
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (stating that “[a]ny person who registers a domain
name that consists of the name of another living person, or a name substantially and
confusingly similar thereto, without that person’s consent, with the specific intent to
profit from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to that person or any
third party, shall be liable in a civil action by such person”), with 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (requiring “a bad faith intent to profit”) (emphasis added). Case law has
not yet, however, made such a distinction. See, e.g., Cline v. 1-888-Plumbing Group,
34
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rarely, if ever, makes such a distinction.40 This Article will address
the bad faith intent to profit standard and provide an analysis of
various cases addressing Internet domain name disputes since the
ACPA’s enactment.
II. THE CASES
A. The First Appellate Bite at the ACPA Apple
Since the ACPA’s inception on November 29, 1999, various
federal courts have tackled issues that the ACPA was intended to
address. The most notable case to date is the first federal appellate
decision utilizing the ACPA to decide a domain name dispute:
Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportman’s Market, Inc.41 In this Second
Circuit case, both sides appeared to be suing each other for
anything and everything.
Briefly stated, Plaintiff-CounterDefendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee Sporty’s Farm L.L.C.
(hereinafter “Sporty’s Farm”) and Defendant-Third-Party-PlaintiffCounter-Claimant-Appellee-Cross Appellant Sportsman’s Market,
Inc. (hereinafter “Sportsman’s”) disputed the rights to the domain
name “sportys.com.”42

Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (making no distinction between personal
names and famous marks and generally stating that it is the bad faith intent to profit
standard that is required for a civil action pursuant to the ACPA).
40
See, e.g., Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130 (D. Colo.
2000) (noting that the “pivotal question is whether [the defendant] ‘has a bad faith intent
to profit’ from the use of the mark,” and making no distinction for different standards
when a personal name is the subject of the litigation as compared to a marked term).
41
202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262 (2000). This case was
initially argued on March 17, 1999, prior to the passing of the ACPA. While the ACPA
was not an issue before the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, which
heard the initial argument prior to this appeal, the Second Circuit decided to use the
ACPA. See id. at 492 (“This case originally involved the application of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) to the Internet. While the case was pending on appeal,
however, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) was passed and
signed into law. That new law applies to this case.”) (citations omitted).
42
See id. There was another party listed in the case, Third-Party-Defendant-Appellee
Omega Engineering, Inc. (the parent company of Sporty’s Farm), who did not contest
anything on appeal because it “prevailed on all claims made against it . . . .” Id. at 495
n.8.
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Sportsman’s was a mail order catalog that sold products
associated with aviation, tools, and home accessories.43 The
company used the term “sporty” as a means for consumers to
identify its products.44 Sportsman’s used this term for almost forty
years prior to the case and registered it as a trademark
approximately fifteen years before commencement of the suit.45
Sportsman’s spent a great deal of money advertising the term
“sporty” for use with the sale of its products and built its company
telephone numbers around this term for consumer convenience.46
Sporty’s Farm, founded in 1996 to sell Christmas trees, was a
subsidiary company to Omega Engineering, Inc. (hereinafter
“Omega”).47 Prior to the creation of Sporty’s Farm, Omega and
another subsidiary company, Pilot’s Depot, created in 1995 for the
purposes of selling products associated with aviation, registered
the domain name sportys.com.48 Omega owner Arthur Hollander,
who “was a pilot who received Sportsman’s catalogs and thus was
aware of the sporty’s trademark,” created both Sporty’s Farm and
Pilot’s Depot.49 Additionally, Sporty’s Farm’s manager, Ralph S.
Michael, served as the CEO for Omega.50
When Sportsman’s learned about the registration of the
sportys.com domain name, Sporty’s Farm brought a declaratory
action to determine who held the rights to the domain name.51
Sporty’s Farm’s apparent reason for choosing the sportys.com
domain name was that manager/CEO Michael
always thought of and referred to the Pennsylvania land
where Sporty’s Farm now operates as Spotty’s Farm. The
origin of the name . . . derived from a childhood memory
[Michael] had of his uncle’s farm in upstate New York. As
a youngster, Michael owned a dog named Spotty. Because
the dog strayed, his uncle took him to his upstate farm.
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id. at 493–94.
Id. at 494.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Michael thereafter referred to the farm as Spotty’s farm.
The name Sporty’s Farm was . . . a subsequent derivation.52
Because it was reported that Hollander—who had knowledge of
the “sporty’s” term and its association with aviation products—
registered the name, and not Michael, the court quickly invalidated
this excuse. The Second Circuit aptly noted that there was “no
evidence in the record that Hollander was considering starting a
Christmas tree business when he registered sportys.com or that
Hollander was ever acquainted with Michael’s dog Spotty.”53
Initially, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut
had based its determination on both traditional trademark
On the traditional
infringement and dilution principles.54
infringement claim, the district court held that Sporty’s Farm did
not violate Sportsman’s trademark rights in the use of sportys.com,
because there was no likelihood of consumer confusion;
Sportsman’s and Sporty’s Farm operated “wholly unrelated
businesses [and t]herefore, confusion in the marketplace is not
likely to develop.”55 On dilution grounds, however, the district
court found that the term “sporty’s” was a famous mark entitled to
protection, and Sporty’s Farm’s use of this term “effectively
compromise[d] Sportsman’s Market’s ability to identify and
distinguish its goods on the Internet.”56 Accordingly, the district
court ordered Sporty’s Farm to relinquish the sportys.com domain
name.57
Between the time the district court heard the case and the case
was presented to the Second Circuit, the ACPA was enacted.
Although the ACPA was not available prior to the appeal, the
Second Circuit noted that its purpose was to address this type of
domain name dispute and other circumstances where ordinary
trademark law principles would not be specifically on point or

52

Id.
Id.
54
Id.
55
Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., No. 3:96CV0756, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23290, at *14 (D. Conn. Mar. 13, 1998).
56
Id. at *23.
57
Id. at *28–*29.
53
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offer strong enough protections to trademark holders.58
Second Circuit therefore applied the ACPA to this case.59

The

The Second Circuit found that the term “sporty’s” was
distinctive and thus entitled to protection under the ACPA.60
Moreover, the court reasoned that this term, as used in the domain
name sportys.com, was “confusingly similar” to the mark
“sporty’s,” despite the fact that there was an apostrophe between
the letter “y” and the second “s” in the protected mark but not in
the domain name.61 The Second Circuit noted that although this
difference prevented the domain name from being “precisely
identical to the sporty’s mark,”62 the trademarked term was still
confusingly similar to the domain name because apostrophes and
other features commonly used in the alphabet could not be used in
an Internet domain name.63
After deciding that the ACPA was applicable to this case and
that the term “sporty’s” was entitled to protection under the Act,
the Sporty’s Farm court needed to determine whether the ACPA
provided a remedy to decide who should have rights to the

58

See Sporty’s Farm, 202 F.3d at 497.
While the [FTDA] has been useful in pursuing cybersquatters, cybersquatters
have become increasingly sophisticated as the case law has developed and now
take the necessary precautions to insulate themselves from liability. For
example, many cybersquatters are now careful to no longer offer the domain
name for sale in any manner that could implicate liability under existing
trademark dilution case law. And, in cases of warehousing and trafficking in
domain names, courts have sometimes declined to provide assistance to
trademark holders, leaving them without adequate and effective judicial
remedies. This uncertainty as to the trademark law’s application to the Internet
has produced inconsistent judicial decisions and created extensive monitoring
obligations, unnecessary legal costs, and uncertainty for consumers and
trademark owners alike.
Id. at 495 (citing S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 7 (1999)).
59
See id. at 496–97 (noting that the general rule is to “apply the law that exists at the
time of the appeal” and finding that the ACPA “constitutes a particularly good fit with
this case”).
60
See id. at 497.
61
See id. at 497–98.
62
Id. at 498.
63
See id. at 497–98.
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sportys.com domain.64 This issue involved an analysis of the “bad
faith intent to profit factors” outlined in the ACPA.65
The Second Circuit addressed most of the ACPA’s bad faith
intent to profit factors as well as issues presented in the facts that
did not fit within the criteria of any enumerated factor. It
determined that there was “ample and overwhelming evidence that,
as a matter of law, Sporty’s Farm’s [sic] acted with a ‘bad faith
intent to profit’ from the domain name sportys.com, as those terms
are used in the ACPA.”66 Addressing the first factor of the bad
faith intent to profit standard, the court found that neither Sporty’s
Farm nor its parent company, Omega, “had any intellectual
property rights in sportys.com at the time Omega registered the
domain name.”67 As the court noted, “Sporty’s Farm was not
formed until nine months after the domain name was registered,
and it did not begin operations or obtain the domain name from
Omega until after [the] lawsuit was filed.”68 Regarding the second
factor of the standard, the court found that the domain name
sportys.com failed to bear any relation to the “legal name of the
party that registered it, Omega.”69 The court addressed the
ACPA’s third bad faith factor and recognized that Sporty’s Farm
had not used the website with the sportys.com name until after the
litigation had begun.70 Applying additional ACPA factors, the
court determined that Sporty’s use of the sportys.com domain was
never “noncommercial,” or a “fair use of the mark,” and that
Sporty’s bought the name from Omega under “suspicious
circumstances.”71
The Sporty’s Farm court went beyond application of the
factors enumerated in the ACPA. It found that the most
convincing basis for a finding of bad faith intent to profit stemmed
from circumstances that were covered within the specific wording

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

See id. at 498.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 498 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I) (2000)).
Id.
Id. at 498–99 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(II)).
Id. at 499 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(III)).
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV), (VI)).
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of the ACPA.72 The court found that Omega’s intentions to “enter
into direct competition with Sportsman’s in the pilot and aviation
consumer market,”73 as well as Hollander’s knowledge that the
term “sporty’s” provided a strong link between the Sportsman’s
company and the products it sold in the aviation market,74 meant
that Omega intended to register sportys.com “for the primary
purpose of keeping Sportsman’s from using that domain name.”75
The court also noted that Omega’s creation of an unrelated
business with the name Sporty’s Farm subsequent to the lawsuit’s
filing, as well as Michael’s suspect explanation for using the
sportys.com domain name, demonstrated evidence of bad faith.76
B. Other Appellate Court ACPA Decisions Since Sporty’s Farm
Sporty’s Farm was the first federal appellate court to apply the
ACPA and it has since been utilized as strong precedent for
interpretation of the statute. In later appellate decisions, the First,
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have also addressed the ACPA in
depth and have discussed the bad faith intent to profit factors.
In Northern Light Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights Club,77
the First Circuit decided a dispute regarding the domain name
“northernlights.com.”78 Since 1997, plaintiff Northern Light
Technology, Inc., used the domain name “northernlight.com” for

72

See id.
Id.
74
See id.
75
Id.
76
See id. (noting that Omega created another company named Sporty’s Farm in an
unrelated business so that it could (1) use the sportys.com name in some commercial
fashion, (2) keep the domain name away from competitor Sportsman’s, and (3) protect
itself in any type of trademark infringement claim brought by Sportsman’s for use of the
name). The court further stated that “the explanation given for Sporty’s Farm’s desire to
use the domain name, based on the existence of the dog Spotty, is more amusing than
credible.” Id. It should be noted, however, that although the court found injunctive relief
proper on behalf of Sportsman’s Market, it found that monetary damages were not
available. Id. at 501. In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit upheld the District
court’s determination that the requirement for damages under the FTDA was not present.
Id. at 500. Further, the Second Circuit reviewed Connecticut law and deemed that its
requirements for damages were also not present in this case. See id. at 500–01.
77
236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001).
78
See id. at 58–61.
73
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use as an Internet search engine.79 The defendant, unlike the
defendant in Sporty’s Farm, had Internet expertise, as it was a
subsidiary company owned by a Canadian corporation whose
president, Mr. Burgar, described himself as an “Internet
entrepreneur.”80 Specifically, Burgar (also a defendant in the case)
had, “since the mid-1990’s, registered thousands of ‘catchy’
domain names . . . the names of popular people and
organizations.”81
He was also president of the subsidiary
corporation, Northern Lights Club, for which the domain name
was used.82 Northern Lights Club was “an unincorporated
association with a listed address in Las Vegas, Nevada.”83 Its
stated mission was to “bring together devotees of the Northern
Lights, or aurora borealis, including businesses that take their
name from the famous celestial phenomenon.”84 Despite this
illustrious description of the organization’s intended purpose,
Burgar’s club failed to develop a strong following. In fact, his
testimony indicated that the club had “no actual individual
members.”85 The plaintiff first learned of the existence of a
website correlating to the northernlights.com domain on March 2,
1999.86
Notwithstanding
defendant’s
claims
of
what
the
northernlights.com site was originally intended for, when the site
went active in April of 1999, it displayed, among other things, a
search feature for specific words or phrases within the site, links to
various businesses, and an unauthorized link to the
northernlight.com website.87 Prior to appeal before the First
Circuit, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
granted a preliminary injunction on grounds, inter alia, that the
defendant would most likely be found to have operated with a bad
79

See id. at 58.
See id. at 58–59 (specifically referring to defendant Jeff Burgar, the President of
641271 Alberta, Ltd.).
81
Id. at 59.
82
See id. at 58–59.
83
Id. at 59.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
See id.
87
See id.
80
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faith intent to profit from use of the northernlights.com domain
name.88
Despite the Sporty’s Farm holding, this may have been the first
federal appellate decision under the ACPA to address the very
reason Congress enacted the ACPA—to tackle the cybersquatter.
The defendant in Northern Lights admitted to registering multiple
domain names containing famous trademarks,89 a modus operandi
that the ACPA was intended to inhibit and control.90 The court
noted (1) the defendant’s multiple registrations, the multiple (and
possibly conflicting) reasons behind the registration of the domain
name at issue; (2) the defendant’s “apparent openness to sell the
northernlight[s].com registration to the plaintiff at the right
price”;91 and (3) a “history of disregarding cease-and-desist letters
from legitimate trademark owners”92 to conclude that the
defendants acted with bad faith and, therefore, affirmed the district
court’s injunction.93
Although this decision in Northern Lights appears consistent
with the stated and intended purpose of the ACPA, the query arises
as to whether the defendant in Northern Lights was a cybersquatter
per se, or a “typosquatter.” A typosquatter is an individual who
registers domain names that have intentional misspellings of
marked terms—a behavior that may be a derivation of a
cybersquatter.94 Although the Northern Lights court faced this

88

See id. at 61 (citing N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 115–
20 (D. Mass. 2000)).
89
See id. at 65.
90
See supra note 6.
91
N. Light Tech., 236 F.3d at 65.
92
Id.
93
See id. at 65–66.
94
See The Word Spy (defining typosquatter as “[a] person who registers one or more
Internet domain names based on the most common typographical errors that a user might
commit when entering a company’s registered trademark name.”), at
http://www.wordspy.com/words/typosquatter.asp (n.d.); Definitions: typosquatting, at
http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/ sDefinition/ 0,,sid26_gci342237,00.html (n.d.).
Typosquatting is a form of Internet cybersquatting, based on the probability
that a certain number of Internet users will mistype the name of a Web site . . .
when surfing the Web. Typically, a typosquatter will register several possible
input errors for a “brand name” Web site known for its high traffic, and then
monitor to see how many clicks a day each of their “typo” domain names
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issue, it did not specifically address it, thus leaving room for a
sophisticated cybersquatter to argue an open question of law not
yet addressed by a federal court of appeals. The Northern Lights
decision unintentionally left the door open for one to find a
loophole in the ACPA.
Any discrepancy left open by Northern Lights, however, was
quickly cleared up in Shields v. Zuccarini,95 where the Third
Circuit had its first opportunity to deal with a cybersquatter.
There, the defendant, John Zuccarini, was notorious for his
registration of many domain names that bore an all-too-striking
resemblance to famous organizations. Mr. Zuccarini was the
stereotypical cybersquatter the ACPA was intended to prevent.
During this litigation, as well as during another well-known case,96
Mr. Zuccarini learned about the effect and purpose of the ACPA
and about domain name disputes.
Before discussing Mr. Zuccarini further, a comparison must be
made to Dennis Toeppen.97 If John Zuccarini is the poster boy for
the type of behavior the ACPA sought to prevent, then Dennis
Toeppen, a pre-ACPA cybersquatter, is the “godfather” of domain
name cyberpiracy.98 Briefly stated, Toeppen was involved in

receives, and use the information to sell advertising for the sites that receive a
high volume of accidental traffic.
Id. See also Lisa T. Oratz, Trademarks and the Internet (“Typosquatters register domain
names that are nearly identical to the actual domain names used by other organizations.
The slight differences between the domain names are intended to catch Web users who
make typographical or punctuation errors when entering a Web site’s address.”), at
http://www.perkinscoie.com/resource/ecomm/trademarks.htm (n.d.).
95
254 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001).
96
See Elecs. Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, No. CIV.A.00-4055, 2000 WL
1622760 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2000).
97
See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Intermatic, Inc.
v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996). These were Mr. Toeppen’s two most
famous cases.
98
Some commentators have even gone so far as to label several of the ACPA bad faith
intent to profit factors as “Toeppen factors.” See, e.g., Jeremy D. Mishkin, Master of
Your Domain—An Overview of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, COMM.
LAW (ABA, Chicago, Ill.), Spring 2000, at 3, 3–5 (commenting on each of the ACPA’s
bad faith intent to profit factors, and implying that some are based on the actions of Mr.
Toeppen), available at http://www.abanet.org/forums/communication/comlawyer/
spring00/mishkins.html.
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several pre-ACPA disputes over domain names.99 He registered
many popular terms as domain names and offered to sell them well
above market value.100 He also used clever tactics, such as
attempting to persuade plaintiffs not to seek remedies in courts,101
and placed pictures and information about localities having a name
similar to a protected mark online, thus trying to legitimize his
behavior.102 None of the courts that heard Toeppen’s cases
condoned his actions.103 Since his last well-known case in 1998,104
as well as the enactment of the ACPA, the cybersquatting world
has not heard much about Toeppen, so it must now rely on the
stories and defenses of John Zuccarini.
In Shields v. Zuccarini,105 the plaintiff was a cartoon artist who
marketed his graphics under the label “Joe Cartoon.” The plaintiff
used this label to identify and market his work for fifteen years
prior to the inception of litigation and even registered the domain
name “joecartoon.com” to display his product online.106 The
defendant, a domain-name “wholesaler,” i.e., one who acquires
“multiple domain names with the intent to profit from them,”107
registered various domain names similar to the plaintiff’s.108 The
defendant
registered
“joescartoon.com,”
“joecarton.com,”
“joescartons.com,” “joescartoons.com,” and “cartoonjoe.com.”109
Initially, the content posted by the defendant on these sites
consisted primarily of advertisements for credit card companies
99

See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1316; Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1227.
See, e.g., Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319; Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1230.
101
See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319.
102
See id.
103
See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324–27; Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239–41.
104
See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1316.
105
254 F.3d 476, 479 (3d Cir. 2001).
106
Id.
107
Id. at n.1.
108
See id. at 479–80; Elecs. Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, No. 00-4055, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15719 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2001), aff’d, No. 01-1476, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9247 (3d Cir. Apr. 25, 2002). This case is discussed in greater detail infra text
accompanying notes 159, 161–165. In Electronics Boutique Holdings, the District court
noted that many other claims have been brought against Zuccarini by entities such as
Radio Shack, Office Depot, Nintendo, Hewlett-Packard, the Dave Matthews Band, the
Wall Street Journal, Encyclopedia Britannica, Guinness beers, Spiegel’s, the Sports
Authority, Yahoo!, and Calvin Klein. Id. at *7.
109
Shields, 254 F.3d at 480.
100
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and other websites. The defendant received revenue when these
sites were viewed.110 After the plaintiff sent cease-and-desist
letters to the defendant, however, the sites’ contents quickly
changed into a self-proclaimed political protest providing a general
rant about various topics. These topics ranged from the idea that
“joecartoon.com is a web site that depicts the mutilation and
killing of animals in a shockwave based cartoon format” to
thoughts on the policies of domain name registries, and even the
ACPA itself.111 Interestingly, all of Mr. Zuccarini’s political views
were directed at his legal adversary as well as the legal tools and
procedures involved in the domain name system.112
One of Zuccarini’s defenses to the ACPA claim was that he
was not “cybersquatting,” the type of behavior the ACPA was
intended to deter.113 Rather, he was “typosquatting.”114 He argued
that this conduct was outside the scope of the ACPA, thus
shielding him from liability.115 The Third Circuit quickly rejected
this defense after noting that a primary legislative intent of the
ACPA was to deter those who “often register well-known marks to
prey on consumer confusion by misusing the domain name to
divert customers from the mark owner’s site” to another site.116
The Third Circuit recognized that the ACPA
covers the registration of domain names that are “identical”
to distinctive or famous marks, but it also covers domain
names that are “confusingly similar” to distinctive or
famous marks. A reasonable interpretation of conduct
covered by the phrase “confusingly similar” is the
intentional registration of domain names that are
misspellings of distinctive or famous names, causing an
Internet user who makes a slight spelling or typing error to
reach an unintended site. . . . [Zuccarini’s] intent was . . . to
register a domain name in anticipation that consumers
110

See id.
See id. (describing defendant’s pages of “POLITICAL PROTEST”) (citing Shields v.
Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 635–36 (E.D. Pa. 2000)).
112
See id.
113
See Shields, 254 F.3d at 483.
114
Id.; see also supra note 94.
115
See id.
116
Id. at 484 (citing S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 15 (1999)).
111
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would make a mistake, thereby increasing the number of
hits his site would receive, and, consequently, the number
of advertising dollars he would gain.117
The Third Circuit deemed Zuccarini’s conduct “a classic example
of a specific practice the ACPA was designed to prohibit.”118 The
Third Circuit held that Zuccarini possessed the requisite bad faith
intent to profit for an action under the ACPA, based on Zuccarini’s
lack of intellectual property rights in the “Joe Cartoon” mark or
any use of it in connection with the bona fide offering of goods or
services.119 In addition, the court found that by diverting
consumers from the plaintiff’s website, the defendant harmed the
good will associated with the “Joe Cartoon” mark.120 Zuccarini
raised an absolute defense to the bad faith intent to profit standard
by insisting that his use of the websites, on which his “political
protest” appeared, was an exercise of his First Amendment right to
free speech.121 He argued that such use was protected from
liability under the ACPA’s “safe harbor” provision.122 The Shields
court quickly rejected this defense, relying on the district court’s
response that Zuccarini’s claim was nothing more than a “spurious
explanation cooked up purely for this suit.”123
In another case applying the ACPA, Virtual Works, Inc. v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc.,124 the Fourth Circuit found that
Virtual Works acted with bad faith intent to profit when it
registered the domain name, “vw.net.” The term “VW” is
commonly associated with the Volkswagen automobile, and those
at Virtual Works who registered this domain name knew that
Internet users might believe “vw.net” was a website associated
with the carmaker.125 In fact, Virtual Works contemplated selling
the domain name for “a lot of money” should Volkswagen be

117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

Id. at 483–84 (citation omitted).
Id. at 484.
Id. at 484–85.
See id. at 485.
See id. at 485.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2000)).
Id. at 485 (quoting Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 640 (E.D. Pa. 2000)).
238 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2001).
See id. at 266.
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interested in its ownership.126 Several Volkswagen dealerships
made offers to Virtual Works for ownership of the domain
In response, a representative of Virtual Works
name.127
telephoned the main Volkswagen office stating that if Volkswagen
did not buy the rights to vw.net within twenty-four hours, the site
would be sold to the highest bidder.128
Applying the ACPA, the Fourth Circuit found that Virtual
Works possessed bad faith intent to profit and affirmed the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia’s judgment to
turn the domain name over to Volkswagen.129 Bad faith was
established based on Virtual Works’ desire to profit from
Volkswagen at the time of registration by registering a domain
name with “overwhelming” similarities to the trademarked term.130
The court also cited the terms of Virtual Works’ offer to
Volkswagen, distinguishing it from legitimate domain name sale
techniques.131
Subsequently, and without reference to Virtual Works, the
Fourth Circuit found that a bad faith intent to profit existed in
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney.132 The
defendant, a former Internet executive who owned 50–60 domain
names, registered “peta.org” and began using the site to mock
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA).133 The web
site displayed a web page entitled “People Eating Tasty Animals”
and provided information supporting issues PETA opposed.134
The Fourth Circuit upheld a district court determination135 that
Doughney possessed a bad faith intent to profit when registering
PETA as a domain name.136 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit
126

Id.
Id. at 266–67.
128
See id. at 267.
129
See id. at 271.
130
See id. at 269–70.
131
See id. at 270.
132
263 F.3d 359, 369 (4th Cir. 2001).
133
See id. at 362–63.
134
See id.
135
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915
(E.D. Va. 2000), aff’d, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001).
136
See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 368–69.
127
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utilized all of the enumerated factors in the ACPA.137 Specifically,
the Fourth Circuit noted that Doughney was an individual who
registered multiple domain names “identical or similar to the
marks or names of famous” persons and organizations, he
possessed no legitimate intellectual property rights or claim to
identity in the “PETA” term, had no prior use of that term, and his
use of the “People Eating Tasty Animals” website was a
commercial use.138 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s finding that Doughney “clearly intended to confuse,
mislead and divert [I]nternet users into accessing his web site
which contained information antithetical and therefore harmful to
the goodwill represented by the PETA Mark.”139 It also found that
by “recommending that PETA attempt to ‘settle’” the dispute,
Doughney showed bad faith intent to profit.140
The Fifth Circuit had its opportunity to interpret and apply the
ACPA in E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs, Ltd.,141 in which
the defendants registered “ernestandjuliogallo.com,” a domain
name essentially identical to the protected title, name, and mark of
the plaintiff’s popular wine selling and distribution business.142 In
its analysis, the Fifth Circuit applied the ACPA consistently with
the interpretations of other federal circuit courts. The Fifth Circuit
relied on the Sporty’s Farm decision, the Shields decision, and the
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals decision in affirming
a finding of bad faith intent to profit.143
Since registering the “Ernest & Julio Gallo” trademark in 1964,
the plaintiffs had registered various similar terms and domain
names but had not registered the specific term at issue.144 They
also spent hundreds of millions of dollars in promoting their brands
137

See id.
See id. at 369.
139
Id. (quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 920).
140
See id.
141
286 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2002).
142
See id. at 276.
143
See id. at 277.
144
See id. at 272; E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1033,
1035 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (noting the various domain names that the plaintiff registered for
its winemaking business, including “GALLO.DE, EJGALL.DE, ERNEST-JULIOGALLO.COM, GALLOWINERY.COM, EJGALLO.COM, and GALLOWINE.COM”).
138
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and brand names.145 The defendant was a limited partnership that
developed Internet address names.146 It registered over two
thousand Internet domain name addresses, many of which could be
associated with well-known businesses, and placed some of these
addresses for sale on eBay with asking prices in excess of
$10,000.147
The
defendants
admitted
that
the
“ernestandjuliogallo.com” domain name was “valuable because of
the goodwill that Gallo had developed in its name” and that when
this domain name was registered, the defendants “hoped that Gallo
would contact” them about the domain name, so they could assist
Gallo “in some way.”148 Approximately six months subsequent to
commencement of this lawsuit, the defendants used the offending
site to discuss the lawsuit, problems associated with the
consumption of alcohol, and “alleged misrepresentations by
corporations.”149
Applying the ACPA, the court found that the defendants could
not claim any intellectual property rights in the domain name.150
This domain name was not used by or used to identify the
defendant Spider Webs in any manner prior to the litigation—an
important characteristic to consider because it is conduct that
relates to three separate factors of the ACPA bad faith intent to
profit analysis.151 More importantly, Spider Webs’ initial use of
the domain name subsequent to the commencement of the
litigation undermined any claim it might have proffered to show
that use of the “ernestandjuliogallo.com” domain name was not in
bad faith.152 The Fifth Circuit also based its finding of bad faith
intent to profit on Spider Webs’ awareness of the goodwill of the
plaintiff’s mark, its specific desire to offer the domain name for
sale, the defendant’s primary function as an entity that registered
145

E. & J. Gallo, 286 F.3d at 272.
Id. at 272.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
See id. at 272–73.
150
See id. at 275.
151
See id. The ACPA bad faith intent to profit factors that this type of conduct covers
are specified in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(III) (2000).
152
Id. at 276 (citing Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 499
(2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262 (2000)).
146
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and resold domain names, and its efforts to sell these domain
names for prices well above market value.153
C. Appellate Decision Analysis
The Virtual Works court appeared to face a similar type of
“infringer” as the Sporty’s Farm court faced; however, this type of
defendant does not appear to be the stereotypical cybersquatter that
the ACPA aims to deter.154 Nevertheless, the facts each circuit
court faced seemed within the realm of criteria for which the
ACPA was intended. Although the Sporty’s Farm court found the
most convincing basis for a determination of bad faith in facts not
specifically within the ACPA’s enumerated factors, it nevertheless
applied the ACPA’s factors to the defendant’s actions.155 The
Virtual Works court, however, did not individually analyze these
various factors, but instead decided the case based on the facts in
the aggregate. While the Virtual Works court used the ACPA as a
guide in making its determination of bad faith intent to profit, it
appeared to base its conclusion on a traditional likelihood of
confusion test with a twist of the factors noted in the ACPA.156
Regardless, when confronted with the stereotypical
cybersquatter, the federal appellate courts appear to stop the
cybersquatter right in his tracks. The Shields case is a perfect
example of a federal appellate court’s use of the ACPA to control a
cybersquatter.157 Relying on the Sporty’s Farm precedent, the
Shields court realized that defendant John Zuccarini was a true
cybersquatter and chose to make an example out of him.158 In
analogous situations, both the E. & J. Gallo Winery court and the
Northern Lights Technology court decided to do the same. Despite
Sporty’s Farm being known as the origin for precedent, Shields, E.
& J. Gallo Winery, and Northern Lights Technology epitomize the
type of individual the creators of the ACPA had in mind prior to its
153

See id. at 276–77.
See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998);
Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
155
See Sporty’s Farm, 202 F.3d at 498–99.
156
See Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 267–70 (4th Cir.
2001).
157
See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001).
158
See id.
154
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enactment. Sporty’s Farm, despite the ultimate finding of bad
faith, considered an alleged infringer that did not engage in the
same type of behavior as the stereotypical cybersquatter. Shields,
E. & J. Gallo Winery, and Northern Lights Technology, on the
other hand, demonstrated that in situations involving true
cybersquatters, application of the ACPA is uniform. It appears that
the holding of Sporty’s Farm will be applicable in situations
involving both the cybersquatter and those who do not fit neatly
into the definition. Sporty’s Farm, therefore, provides the best
basis for ACPA interpretation.
D. District Court Determinations
Similar to federal appellate decisions, district courts have also
found bad faith intent to profit present in various cases. There
appears to be little, if any, deviation from federal precedent and
Sporty’s Farm.
One district court case, Electronics Boutique Holdings Corp. v.
Zuccarini,159 involved the infamous John Zuccarini, of, among
others, Shields v. Zuccarini160 fame. As in Zuccarini’s other
brushes with the ACPA, several domain names similar to the
plaintiff’s protected mark were at issue.161 Plaintiff Electronics
Boutique, the well-known retailer of video and computer games
and accessories, had intellectual property rights in the terms
“electronics boutique” and “EB.”162 Zuccarini registered various
domain names with very similar spellings to these marks—often
only one letter off from the actual word.163
In analyzing the ACPA claim, the Electronics Boutique court
found that Zuccarini acted with a bad faith intent to profit from his
multiple registrations of domain names similar to plaintiff’s
mark.164 The court applied the ACPA bad faith intent to profit
159

No. 00-4055, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15719 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2001), aff’d, No. 011476, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9247 (3d Cir. Apr. 25, 2002).
160
See Shields, 254 F.3d at 476.
161
Elecs. Boutique, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15719, at *2–*3.
162
See id. at *6–*7.
163
See id. at *8.
164
See id. at *19 (“Mr. Zuccarini’s bad-faith intent to profit from the domain
misspellings is abundantly clear.”).
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factors and found that Zuccarini had no legitimate purpose for
registration of the domain names and that he “intended to prey on
the confusion and typographical and/or spelling errors of Internet
users . . . for his own commercial gain.”165
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, in
Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick,166 also found a bad faith intent
to profit in a case involving an individual who registered multiple
domain names that were identical or closely similar to protected
marks. The defendant registered domain names with both actual
spellings and common misspellings of the plaintiff’s well-known
law firm,167 as well as domain names containing names of similar
firms.168 The plaintiff, an established law firm, litigated for the
rights to the domain names.169 On the web sites linked to the
domain names, the defendant had established web pages
containing offensive messages about the plaintiff, such as “We’re
your good paid friends!”; “Best friends money can buy”; “Greed is
good”; “We bend over for you . . . because you bend over for us!”;
and “Parasites No Soul . . . No Conscience . . . No Spine . . . NO
PROBLEM.”170 The defendant also included links to other sites
containing offensive phrases, thus suggesting that the plaintiff
affiliated with certain unpopular causes and organizations.171 The

165

Id. at *20.
94 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Colo. 2000).
167
See id. at 1127 (Wick “registered the domain names www.morrisonfoerster.com,
www.morrisonandfoerster.com,
www.morrisonforester.com,
and
www.morrisonandforester. com . . . .”).
168
See id. at 1132 (Wick “registered the names of over ninety law firms, including:
www.HollandandHart.com,
www.McKennaandCuneo.com,
www.BakerandHostetler.com, [and] www.HallandEvans.com.”).
169
See id. at 1126–28.
170
Id. at 1128.
171
See
id.
(The
defendant
included
links
such
as
“www.LetsDoSomeIllegalSteroids.com,
www.GestapoTactics.com,
www.HolocaustMemorial.com,
www.MightAsWellFireUpThe
Ovens.com,
www.JewKike.com,
www.NoIrishNeedApply.com,
www.NativeAmericansAre
FinallyGettingTheirLandBack.com,
[and]
www.WhatExcuseDoWeGetToUseForTheNext ColumbineHighSchoolTragedy.com.”).
166

6-SILBERLIGHT FORMAT

2002]

DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES UNDER THE ACPA

12/12/02 4:23 PM

297

defendant described his actions as a method of “messing” and
“hav[ing] fun with” big law firms and corporate America.172
The Morrison & Foerster court found that the defendant
possessed a bad faith intent to profit when registering the domain
names.173 Analyzing the ACPA’s factors, the court based its
determination on: (1) the defendant’s lack of any rights or interest
in the registered names; (2) the lack of any prior use by the
defendant of the domain names; and (3) the likelihood that the
names as registered would cause public confusion, divert Internet
surfers, and disparage the plaintiff’s reputation.174 Although the
defendant did not make a specific offer to sell the domain names to
the plaintiff for a high price, the court nevertheless found that the
defendant acted in a manner for financial gain based on an external
factor to the situation. One of the domain names that defendant
owned was entitled “NameIsForSale.com,” which the court found
sufficient to support a “reasonable inference of intent to sell the
domain names for a profit.”175 The court overlooked any actual
action by the defendant to transfer ownership of any registered
domain name, recognizing that he could not have had time to
negotiate potential sales of the registered names because he was
too busy litigating domain name disputes.176
Behavior that did not fall within any of the specified ACPA
factors supplemented the finding of bad faith and quite possibly
secured the court’s ultimate determination. The Morrison &
Foerster court frowned heavily upon the defendant’s “parody” of
law firms and other corporations and did not approve of his
personal, vengeful tactics and misappropriation of protected terms
and marks.177
In Victoria’s Cyber Secret L.P. v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,178
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida found
172

Id. at 1133 (citing the defendant’s testimony in which he admitted to partaking in this
behavior for comical reasons in an attempt to get even with companies after a contractual
relation with a company was terminated).
173
See id. at 1133–34.
174
See id. at 1131–32.
175
Id. at 1132.
176
See id.
177
See id. at 1133.
178
161 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
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that a bad faith intent to profit existed where the plaintiff registered
multiple domain names containing the words “victoria” and
“secret.”179 The defendant, Victoria’s Secret, is the maker of
intimate apparel for women.180 The plaintiff claimed that it
registered the domain names to publicize its affiliation with
Playboy model Victoria Silvstedt, and as such, would have both a
legitimate and fair use of any domain name including the terms,
“victoria’s,” “sex,” and “secret.”181 The plaintiff, however, never
used the domain names at issue.182 Additionally, the domain
names were offered for sale to the defendant for “an amicable
transfer agreement” to the plaintiff’s attorney.183 Nevertheless,
similar to the circuit and district court decisions discussed above,
the court found that the plaintiff violated the ACPA and had no
valid intellectual property rights in the registered terms. In
addressing the plaintiff’s fair use defense, the court noted that one
would need to be sophisticated in Internet adult entertainment to
connect Victoria Silvstedt with the domain name, thereby negating
the defense that no likelihood of confusion existed.184 The court
also noted that consumer confusion may arise because the domain
names at issue would potentially “divert Internet consumers
looking for Victoria’s Secret’s website to its own websites.”185 An
additional weak point in the plaintiff’s case was that any affiliation
it may have had with Silvstedt was mutually terminated. In fact,
Silvstedt filed documents with the court stating that she never
consented to the plaintiff’s use of her name.186 Thus, any possible
justification the plaintiff may have claimed for maintaining rights
to use the words “Victoria’s” and “secret” was clearly negated.187
In an interesting case, CNN v. cnnews.com,188 the plaintiff was
known worldwide as the originator of the cable news channel.189
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id. at 1349.
See id.
See id. at 1344, 1353.
Id. at 1343 (citing the pleadings filed in the case).
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 1348.
See id.
177 F. Supp. 2d 506 (E.D. Va. 2001) (mem.).
See id. at 511–12.
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The defendant, a subsidiary of a conglomerate based in China,
used the “cnnews.com” website “to provide news and information
to Chinese-speaking individuals worldwide.”190 The defendant
claimed that this domain name was chosen because it stood for
“China News” that “cn” is “widely used and understood to be an
abbreviation for the country name ‘China’ and ‘cn’ is the top-level
Internet domain for China.”191 The defendant further contended
that its target audience was “located entirely within China,” despite
the court’s observation that there was “a significant amount of
English language content on both the cnnews.com site and various
linked sites.”192
Applying the ACPA factors, the CNN court found a bad faith
intent to profit.193 The court found that the defendant had no
intellectual or fair use rights in the domain name cnnews.com and
had not used this particular name for any reason prior to its
registration.194 Despite the CNN court’s finding that several ACPA
factors supported bad faith, the court’s most compelling reason for
this finding was based on the ACPA’s fifth factor: the intent to
divert consumers to another site with the purpose of damaging the
goodwill of the mark.195 The court found that the defendant went
well beyond its stated target audience by placing a substantial
amount of English on the site, as well as registering the domain
name with a “.com,” thereby ending with a domain registry from
the U.S.196 The court concluded, therefore, that the defendant
possessed a bad faith intent to profit.197

190

Id. at 512.
Id.
192
Id.
193
See id. at 523–27. It should be noted that this case is interesting for reasons beyond
the scope of this article, as this case noted that the bad faith intent to profit standard is
applicable to the in rem provisions of the ACPA. Id. at 510. See also BroadBridge Media,
L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty
Internet Domain Names, 110 F. Supp. 2d 420, 425 (E.D. Va. 2000). The ACPA enacted
in rem provisions to address problems that mark holders were having in gaining personal
jurisdiction over cybersquatters. CNN, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
194
See CNN, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 525–26.
195
See id. at 525.
196
See id. at 526.
197
See id.
191

6-SILBERLIGHT FORMAT

300

12/12/02 4:23 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:269

Similarly, in Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. v. Vogue
International,198 the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey found that the defendant possessed a bad faith intent to
profit because the defendant registered several domain names
containing the word “vogue.”199 Plaintiff, owner of the popular
Vogue magazine, sought to register a domain name including this
term.200 In addition to finding that the defendant lacked any
intellectual property rights in terms included in the domain names,
the court found a bad faith intent to profit because, by the
defendant’s own admissions, he sought to capitalize from the
notoriety of the plaintiff’s protected mark.201
Recently, in Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo
Ayuntamiento de Barcelona,202 the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia found that the defendant had a bad
faith intent to profit from registration of “barcelona.com” and was
thus liable under the ACPA.203 The plaintiff, the registrant, sought
a declaratory judgment against the defendant, the City Council of
Barcelona, Spain.204 Interestingly, this case involved application
of the ACPA to a foreign trademark.205 The court found a bad
faith intent to profit based on the behavior of the owners of the
barcelona.com domain name in registering approximately sixty
“web sites containing city names and . . . well over 100 names in
total.”206 The barcelona.com site consisted of information about
the city of Barcelona, but this information was “provided through
third party affiliates of barcelona.com, and not barcelona.com, Inc.
itself,”207 thus making it “a mere conduit to other sites.”208 The
corporation that registered this domain name was incorporated
198

123 F. Supp. 2d 790 (D.N.J. 2000).
See id. at 794.
200
See id. at 792–93.
201
See id. at 800.
202
189 F. Supp. 2d 367 (E.D. Va. 2002).
203
See id.
204
See id. at 369.
205
See id. at 373 (“It is untenable to suppose that Congress, aware of the fact that the
Internet is so international in nature, only intended for U.S. trademarks to be protected
under the Anticybersquatting statute.”).
206
Id. at 374.
207
Barcelona.com, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 374.
208
Id. at 375.
199
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three years after the actual registration of the domain name and
eight months after the domain name’s owner first offered to
negotiate for ownership of the name.209 The registrants of the
domain name did not have any employees or assets other than the
name itself, and changed its contact information during the
“negotiations” between the parties for the site.210
These
circumstances, in addition to a lack of any intellectual property
rights in the term “Barcelona,” led the court to find that the
registrant acted in bad faith.211
Various additional cases demonstrate the intolerance courts
hold for those registering domain names with a bad faith intent to
profit. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York found a bad faith intent to profit where a defendant registered
multiple variations of a protected mark, operated a website offering
the same type of services that a mark holder offered, and even
provided links on the site to the protected mark holders’
competitors.212 The same court also found a bad faith intent to
profit where the defendant, among other things, held a domain
name “hostage” until the plaintiff agreed to pay “an exorbitant
amount of money” for the ownership, rental, or other property
interest in the domain name.213 Likewise, the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of California found a bad faith intent to
profit in Porsche v. Spencer,214 where the plaintiff, maker of the
Porsche brand automobile, faced off against a registrant of multiple
domain names for rights to the name, “porschesource.com.”215
The defendant in Porsche was the typical cybersquatter who had
no rights in the domain name at issue, no real prior use, and
registered many other domain names with words similar to
209

See id. at 374–75.
See id. at 375.
211
See id. at 375–76.
212
Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Rosado, 122 F. Supp. 2d 403, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(providing an example of how the ACPA applies to a situation where a domain name
registrant used the words of a protected mark to partake in the same type of business in
which a mark holder had become established).
213
BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 512 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (basing a finding of bad faith intent to profit on ACPA statutory factors, but
finding this aspect of the case “particularly relevant” to the inquiry).
214
55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
215
See id. at 1028–39.
210
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protected marks.216 Based on these criteria, the court found that
the defendant had exhibited a bad faith intent to profit when
registering the domain name.217
Despite the holdings of the above noted cases, there may be
one area in which courts have exhibited even less tolerance for
those who use protected terms in domain names. This type of
situation may arise if a domain name, similar to a protected term, is
registered for the purpose of disseminating pornographic material.
The use of a popular term to promote an adult entertainment
website occurred in Mattel, Inc. v. Internet Dimensions, Inc.,218
where
the
defendant
used
the
domain
name
“barbiesplaypen.com.”219 The plaintiff, maker of the incredibly
popular Barbie doll, sued the defendant for registering this domain
name and displaying pornographic material on a web page that
popped up when the domain name was accessed.220
The Mattel court found a bad faith intent to profit when the
defendant registered this domain name because the defendant, as
with many registrants in the previously mentioned cases, lacked
any intellectual property rights, had no legitimate reason for using
the name “Barbie,” and there was no prior, noncommercial, or fair
use of the name “Barbie.”221 The defendant never espoused a
desire to sell the domain name to the plaintiff. The court’s main
concern, however, was that the defendant’s use of the domain
name would tarnish the Barbie doll image because Internet users
would be directed to the site after plugging the term “Barbie” into
an Internet search engine.222 This last factor provided the strongest
basis for the Mattel court to conclude that the defendant acted with
a bad faith intent to profit.
While this Article identifies cases applying the ACPA that
found a bad faith intent to profit, there are also many cases in
which no violation of the ACPA was found. For instance, where
216
217
218
219
220
221
222

See id. at 1041–46.
See id. at 1047.
55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1620 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (mem.).
See id. at 1624.
See id. at 1623–24.
See id. at 1632–33, 1638.
See id. at 1633–34.
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both the plaintiff and the defendant had rights to use the term
“Chambord” in connection with the sale of coffee, foods, and other
products, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found that no violation of the ACPA existed.223
Additionally, in Greenpoint Financial Corp. v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co.,224 the plaintiff, a nationwide financial institution,
fought for rights to the domain name “greenpoint.com” against the
defendant company who produced the “Green Stamps” program
that gained fame in the 1960’s and 1970’s.225 The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York determined that the
provisions of the ACPA were not violated and that the defendant
did not act in bad faith because the defendant had a bona fide
business reason for registering the name.226
Cello Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence-Dahl Cos.227 was another
case in which a federal district court did not find that a bad faith
intent to profit existed. This case, however, should be only briefly
addressed because the facts bear some similarity to other cases in
which a violation of the ACPA was found. In Cello Holdings, the
defendant, a former musician, registered the domain name
“cello.com” because he wanted to register names of musical
instruments.228 The court’s decision notes that the defendant also
registered other domain names that failed to bear any relation to
instruments or music and was aware that the plaintiff’s company
used the term “cello” in its title.229 At the time the defendant
registered the domain name, there was a myriad of companies that
had some degree of intellectual property rights in entities identified
with cello.230 Additionally, the defendant offered the cello.com
domain name to at least nine of these companies for a price in the

223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230

Chatam Intern., Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
116 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
See id. at 408.
See id. at 414.
89 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id. at 467–68.
Id.
Id.
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range of $5,000.231 Both parties in Cello Holdings moved for
summary judgment in their favor.232
The Cello Holdings court found that the parties presented
evidence tending both to support and not support a finding of “bad
faith intent to profit.”233 The court recognized that the defendant’s
conduct was the modus operandi of the stereotypical cybersquatter:
he registered a domain name that he possessed no rights to and he
“engaged in a pattern of registering domain names that could be of
interest to others and then trying to sell them.”234 Nonetheless, the
court refused to find that a bad faith intent to profit existed and
refused to grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff
because: (1) the court believed that a reasonable fact finder could
find that the defendant “did not act with an intent to ‘blackmail’ or
‘extort’ Cello”; (2) the defendant’s offer for sale was a general
offer rather than one directed at the plaintiff for an exorbitant sum;
and (3) the term “cello” has a meaning in the English language,
and, therefore, the defendant may have had a degree of fair use in
the term.235
Cello Holdings appears to concern the type of behavior the
ACPA intended to deter. The defendant registered multiple
domain names and offered them for sale at prices well above
market value. The court was still reluctant to find a bad faith intent
to profit, despite being presented with a defendant who acted in the
manner of a typical cybersquatter.
E. A Possible Misapplication of the ACPA
Despite the previously mentioned cases, demonstrating a
degree of consistency in ACPA interpretation, there still seem to
be a number of decisions representing a minority opinion. In
Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Karpachev,236 for instance, the
plaintiff, popularly known as TD Waterhouse, was a worldwide
corporation that provided financial services to over four million
231
232
233
234
235
236

Id. at 468.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 474.
Id.
Id.
188 F. Supp. 2d 110, 111 (D. Mass. 2002).
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people and conducted business online with the domain name
“tdwaterhouse.com.”237 The defendant, a disgruntled former
customer of the plaintiff who faced thousands in financial loss due
to an action of the plaintiff, “registered sixteen domain names
composed
of
variant
misspellings
of
the
name
tdwaterhouse.com.”238 These sites contained web pages accusing
the plaintiff of various crimes and comparing the plaintiff to the
Nazis and other intolerable political groups.239 The U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment
in favor of the plaintiff. It found that defendant Karpachev, a
perturbed typosquatter possessed bad faith based on his “intent to
‘tarnish or disparage’ the [plaintiff’s] mark” and his “admitted
intent to ‘divert consumers from [the plaintiff’s] mark . . . by
creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship or
affiliation, or endorsement of the site.’”240 The court also noted
that the defendant possessed no intellectual property rights in the
registered domain names and that the domain names he registered
were “confusingly similar” to the plaintiff’s mark.241
This seems to be a clear-cut case of the type of conduct the
ACPA was intended to address: a defendant registering multiple
variations of a popular and protected term and disparaging it by
deliberately attempting to undermine the goodwill of the term; this
is analogous to the situation encountered in the Shields case. This
does not appear, however, to be consistent with the above-noted
precedent, as the decision makes no mention of a desire to profit
from the registration of such names. As already noted, the ACPA
requires a finding of bad faith intent to profit, which is a separate
and distinct standard from ordinary bad faith.242 Although several
commentators have distinguished between when a showing of bad
237

Id.
Id.
239
Id. at 112.
240
Id. at 114 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 15(d)(1)(B)(i)(V) (2000)).
241
Id.
242
See Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 499 n.13 (2d Cir.
2000) (noting that “‘bad faith intent to profit’ are terms of art in the ACPA and hence
should not necessarily be equated with ‘bad faith’ in other contexts”), cert. denied, 530
U.S. 1262 (2000); Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1125 (D. Minn.
2000) (distinguishing between a party’s bad intent and the bad faith intent to profit
standard necessary for an ACPA claim).
238

6-SILBERLIGHT FORMAT

306

12/12/02 4:23 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:269

faith intent to profit must be proven and when simply a showing of
bad faith must be proven,243 the case law on the ACPA has not, to
date, recognized such a distinction for purposes of application.
Notwithstanding a possible disposition in favor of the plaintiff
under traditional trademark or dilution law, Toronto-Dominion
does not appear to be a case in which the court properly applied the
ACPA.
Instead, the court in Toronto-Dominion Bank should have paid
attention to the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota’s
decision in Northland Insurance Cos. v. Blaylock.244 In Northland
Insurance, like in Toronto-Dominion Bank, the court was
presented with a defendant who was a disgruntled former customer
of an company with a protected mark.245 The defendant’s main
gripe was that he was not fully reimbursed for damages to his
yacht, which he had insured through the plaintiff’s company.246 As
a result, he registered two domain names, one of which was
“northlandinsurance.com,” to “house complaints and criticism of
[the] plaintiff’s business.”247
Despite the uncanny resemblance between the domain name
that the defendant registered and the name of the plaintiff’s
company, the Northland Insurance court found no violation of the
ACPA.248 Perhaps more importantly, it refused to recognize the
defendant as the type of individual—the cybersquatter—that the
ACPA was intended to address.249 The Northland Insurance
court’s reluctance to accept the plaintiff’s argument that the
defendant was indeed a cybersquatter, coupled with the

243

See Slonaker, supra note 37, at 134 (outlining the standard the ACPA sets forth for
trademarked terms and noting that it “also protects against the domain name registration
of the name of living persons without their consent if there is a specific intent to profit
from the selling of that name”).
244
See Northland Ins., 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1108.
245
Id. at 1114.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id at 1125.
249
Id. (The “defendant does not fit the classic cybersquatter profile because there is no
evidence that he has registered other variants of plaintiff’s name or previously has
registered marks as domain names.”).
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noncommercial purpose of the defendant’s website, led to the
determination that no violation of the ACPA took place.250
The Northland Insurance court decision seems like the more
logical outcome for a case where a court is faced with an
individual whose primary purpose in registering a particular name
is to make a statement, regardless of whether or not the statement
is negative. The ACPA specifically provided a “safe harbor”
defense251 and one of the bad faith intent to profit factors
specifically takes into account any type of “fair use” that an
alleged infringer may possess.252 The uses by the defendants in
both Toronto-Dominion Bank and Northland Insurance appeared
to be noncommercial expressions of their personal distaste for
particular entities. Use of the ACPA to suppress these types of
ideas may tread on areas protected by freedom of expression
principles. Although First Amendment concerns are beyond the
scope of this Article, the types of behavior observed in these two
cases do not seem to be the type that the ACPA was enacted to
prevent.
F. District Court Application of the ACPA and Comparisons to
Appellate Courts
Other than Karpachev, federal district courts’ interpretation of
bad faith intent to profit under the ACPA has been consistent.
District courts have interpreted and applied the factors embodied
within the ACPA in the same manner as the federal appellate
courts, and for the most part, have adhered to Sporty’s Farm as the
most influential precedent in ACPA actions.
When the display of pornographic material is not involved,
there appears to be three main issues courts will examine when
encountered with a claim regarding a domain name dispute: (1) the
registrant’s intellectual property rights in terms included in the
registered domain name, (2) the registrant’s willingness or offer to
sell the domain name above market value, and (3) the number of
250

Id. at 1124–25.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2000); Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of
Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2001).
252
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV).
251
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domain names registered by the registrant. One could contend that
these three issues more or less define the stereotypical
cybersquatter, and the very type of person that the ACPA was
intended to stop.
The title of this Article asked the question “when is bad faith
intent to profit really bad faith?” In reviewing cases, both at the
appellate and the district court level, the answer to this question
seems to revolve around the three issues highlighted in the
preceding paragraph. As demonstrated in several earlier examples,
once a court finds a lack of intellectual property rights in a given
term, coupled with a desire to sell the domain name and/or
multiple registration, it seems likely that a finding of bad faith
intent to profit will occur. This method of application by federal
courts helps explain why application of the ACPA, to date, seems
consistent.
While those like John Zuccarini have been pummeled by the
ACPA in federal courts, the courts still find no violation when a
particular domain name, similar to a popular and protected mark, is
innocently acquired. This sums up the original purpose of the
ACPA and demonstrates that it has been applied as intended. It,
therefore, appears as if district court interpretation of the ACPA,
with the exception of one or two distinct decisions, has been
uniform in application and has modeled itself after its appellate
precedent.
III. THE QUESTION: HAS THE ACPA REALLY CHANGED
ANYTHING?
As noted ad nauseum, the ACPA was enacted to provide
further protections for domain name owners seeking to ward off
cybersquatters. Since its enactment, the ACPA has satiated those
commentators concerned with the changes deemed necessary to
handle domain name disputes, and who offered suggestions for
improvement.253
Despite these general criticisms of the
253

See, e.g., Carl Oppedahl, Advise Clients on Internet Domain Names that Infringe
Trademarks, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 1995, at 5 (making recommendations for intellectual
property practitioners, intellectual property organizations, and business with popular
brand names to better improve the domain name dispute situation); Carl Oppedahl,
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applicability of trademark law to domain name disputes prior to the
ACPA, deference must be afforded to its applicability, and as such,
defense of traditional trademark principles is proper. Some would
say that ordinary and contemporary trademark law was not an
appropriate mechanism to handle the situations for which the
ACPA was created. This was because of an apparent difference
between the evils that traditional trademark law was intended to rid
and the way in which the Internet Domain Name System (DNS)
works.254 This difference lies in the belief that trademark law was
never intended to promote the monopolization of a particular mark
or word,255 while DNS provides for the exclusive use of a
particular term in a secondary level domain.
It is true that many have called for change and reform in the
space where trademark law meets the Internet.256 Before one
overly criticizes the application of traditional trademark law to

Courts Grapple With Remedies in Internet Domain Name Trademark Suits, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 22, 1996, at 5 (analyzing the 1996 Federal Anti-Dilution Law that was commonly
used against cybersquatters as the lead basis of a civil suit for domain name mark
infringement prior to the enactment of the ACPA).
254
See, e.g., Blasbalg, supra note 14, at 585 (“Trademark law and domain name
concepts conflict in a number of ways. These conflicts make the application of
trademark law to cybersquatting cases difficult.”).
255
See Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 133 (D. Mass. 1999)
(1st Cir. 2000) (“Holders of a famous mark are not automatically entitled to use that mark
as their domain name; trademark law does not support such a monopoly.”), aff’d, 232
F.3d 1.
256
See, e.g., Kathryn A. Kleiman, Comments of the Domain Name Rights Coalition to
Second Revised Substantive Guidelines Concerning Administrative Domain Name
Challenge Panels, at http://www.gtld-mou.org/notice-97–03/0024.html (last modified
Dec. 6, 1997) (offering commentary on various changes believed to be needed to be
implemented into the Internet Domain Name Scheme at the time of publication); Milton
Mueller, Trademarks and Domain Names: Property Rights and Institutional Evolution in
Cyberspace (“Important revisions need to be made in the policies and laws regarding
domain name-trademark conflicts. Current law and policy clearly recognize that domain
names can be used to violate legitimate trademark rights. That recognition must be
balanced with an explicit recognition that trademark claims can be used to abuse
legitimate domain name usage.”), at http://istweb.syr.edu/~mueller/study.html (n.d.);
United States Patent & Trademark Office, Report to Congress: The Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act of 1999, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/
tmcybpiracy/repcongress.pdf (last visited June 16, 2002) (detailing various problems that
Congress had to deal with prior to the enactment of the ACPA).
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DNS,257 an analysis of other legal theories appropriate for handling
such a situation should be undertaken. Trademark law was used
from the inception of litigation concerning domain name disputes
and has been both adapted and expanded by the creation of the
ACPA to better handle domain name disputes.258 To make a
comparison in layperson’s terms, those who often criticize our
system of government for various reasons are often countered with
the infamous Winston Churchill maxim that “democracy is the
worst form of Government except all those other forms that have
been tried from time to time.”259 During the mid-1990’s, when
courts first faced legal questions regarding the proper use and
ownership of terms and phrases used in Internet addresses,
trademark law was the best available vehicle for courts to use and
provided the most equitable results.260 Changes were necessary to
257

See, e.g., John Carson et al., Claim Jumping on the Newest Frontier: Trademarks,
Cybersquatting, and the Judicial Interpretation of Bad Faith, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 27,
28 (2000) (“Traditional trademark and federal anti-dilution laws were insufficient to
solve the problem. . . . [T]he effectiveness of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
(FTDA) had been limited because cybersquatters were adapting their activities to avoid
liability.”); Gutierrez, supra note 22, at 155 (“[T]rademark infringement law has been an
ineffective way of curbing cybersquatters.”).
258
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000). The ACPA uses terms to guide courts when faced
with a domain name dispute. For instance, the ACPA uses the term “confusingly similar”
as a way for a court to find that bad faith exists. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I). Although this
standard is distinct from the traditional likelihood of confusion examination, it does
demonstrate a link between the ACPA and traditional trademark law, and serves as a
platform for one to observe ACPA’s logical basis. Cf. id. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
259
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 150:19 (3d ed. 1979).
260
There are several pre-ACPA cases pertaining to the application of trademark
infringement and dilution claims in domain name disputes. See, e.g., Avery Dennison
Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999); Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v.
Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1999); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast
Entm’t, Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620 (6th
Cir. 1998); Shades Landing, Inc. v. Williams, 76 F. Supp. 2d 983 (D. Minn. 1999);
CCBN.com, Inc., v. C-call.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 1999); Hasbro, Inc. v.
Clue Computing, Inc. 66 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. 1999); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky,
993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985
F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Juno Online Servs., L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F.
Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Cardservice Int’l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va.
1997); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996); MTV Networks v.
Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Blasbalg, supra note 14, at 566 (“Before the
enactment of the ACPA the most successful remedy available to the victims of
cybersquatting was the use of federal trademark law.”).
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allow trademark law to keep up with technological innovations that
may not have been foreseeable at the time contemporary principles
of trademark law were initially articulated in the federal courts
over forty years ago.261 At the time that trademark law was
developing in regards to this topic, it was the correct tool to resolve
disputes.
But has the ACPA or the cases applying it affected traditional
trademark principles in a different way from what traditional
trademark law was created for in the first place? The ACPA was
designed to rid a particular evil: the prominence of
cybersquatters262 taking well-known names and using them as
Internet addresses. Cases applying the ACPA have used the
statute’s bad faith intent to profit factors as a tool to determine
which party has the more legitimate right to the domain name.263
It is the application and extension of such bad faith intent to profit
factors that have served as a protective shield against the
cybersquatter.264
261

See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). This is
a landmark case in trademark law where the Second Circuit promulgated factors to
properly assess whether a substantial likelihood of confusion was present:
(1) the degree of strength the plaintiff has in his mark;
(2) the similarity between the marks;
(3) the types of people who are most likely to purchase what the two parties
offer on the
market;
(4) any evidence which tends to prove that there is actual confusion present;
(5) the intent of the defendant;
(6) the proximity of the products;
(7) the likelihood that the prior owner would bridge the gap;
(8) the quality of defendant’s product.
Id.
262
See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
263
See, e.g., Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos L.D.T.A., 273 F.3d 14, 28 (1st Cir.
2001) (“Congress has defined in the ACPA what it means to lack a legitimate interest in a
domain name under U.S. law.”); Ford Motor Co. v. Lapertosa, 126 F. Supp. 2d 463, 465
(E.D. Mich. 2000) (providing an example of a case in which a court has highlighted most,
if not all, of the bad faith intent to profit factors of the ACPA en route to a
determination).
264
See Matthew Edward Searing, “What’s in a Domain Name?” A Critical Analysis of
the National and International Impact on Domain Name Cybersquatting, 40 WASHBURN
L.J. 110, 131 (2000) (Due to the ACPA, “cybersquatters will have a harder time avoiding
court penalties because it is harder to predict how courts will determine bad faith
intent.”).
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Instead of amending traditional trademark principles, the
ACPA has been used as a substitute for trademark law. In
addition, since its inception in November 1999, it has been used as
a mechanism to prevent the overlap of traditional trademark
concepts with the system of domain name rights and registration.
Perhaps this is why the Second Circuit in Sporty’s Farm seemed so
eager to apply the newly created ACPA.265 Not only was it
deemed the appropriate law to handle the facts presented, but it
also allowed the court to shift the emphasis that traditional
trademark concepts had on DNS to a newly created statutory cause
of action.266 Since the Sporty’s Farm case, as noted in this Article,
other courts have applied the ACPA in greater depth to deal with
domain name disputes rather than basing claims on trademark
infringement or the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA),
another statute created primarily for the purpose of combating
cybersquatters.267 Instead of amending the general concepts of
trademark law until a certain branch was narrowly tailored for
domain disputes, a new law was created. This law not only
attempts to fix a problem not specifically addressed in prior
legislation, but also appeases those critics who believed the
concepts of traditional trademark law were stretched too far to deal
with the DNS problem.268

265

See id. at 125–29 (noting the Sporty’s Farm courts as well as the district court of the
Zuccarini decision to be examples of “courts’ willingness to accept and apply the bad
faith factors” of the ACPA).
266
See P. Wayne Hale, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act & Sporty’s
Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 205, 212 (2001) (The
ACPA’s remedies “are a significant extension beyond those available under traditional
trademark law.”).
267
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). This provision of the Lanham Act states that an
“owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon
such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person’s
commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark
has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark . . . .” To
show dilution, a plaintiff must show that (1) a mark is famous; (2) that the defendant
made commercial use of the mark; (3) that the defendant’s use of the mark began
subsequent to the mark becoming famous; and (4) that the defendant’s use of the mark
diminishes the mark’s ability to identify and distinguish goods and services. See
Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998).
268
See Searing, supra note 264, at 118 (noting that trademark principles applied prior to
the ACPA were vague and sometimes inapplicable to domain disputes).
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The ACPA deals specifically with an Internet domain name
that is the subject of a dispute, but a term, word, or phrase, in and
of itself, is not a trademark. Instead, a trademark takes into
account other features—essentially anything adding to the
distinctiveness of a mark identifying a particular item.269 It is the
groupings of words, symbols and logos that is the trademark and
not the word by itself. It is these groupings of words and logos
that are non-existent when it comes to domain names, thus
providing a lack of protection for mark owners in certain
circumstances where the defendant’s conduct fails to rise to the
level of infringement or dilution.270 This is true even though “the
most valuable asset a company owns is its name.”271 In fact, a
company name used as a domain name “has a significant and
measurable monetary value, especially when the name is used to
trade on the borrowed good will and reputation of another
party.”272 The lack of protection for mark holders serves as a gray
area and a void that the ACPA was intended to fill and, as
demonstrated in practice, actually does fill.273 Of course, not all
situations fall within this gray area, and thus the outcome in these
cases, regardless of whether or not a party bases a claim on the
ACPA, the FTDA, or another trademark theory, will remain the
same. For instance, in the most clear-cut and egregious situations
(i.e., the defendant—such as Zuccarini274 or Toeppen275—is a true
cybersquatter), the cybersquatter will face defeat regardless of the
claim’s source. Additionally, those types of cases involved
269

The term “trademark” is defined as a “word, phrase, logo, or other graphic symbol
used by a manufacturer or seller to distinguish its product or products from those of
others. . . . To receive federal protection, a trademark must be (1) distinctive rather than
merely descriptive, (2) affixed to a product that is actually sold in the marketplace, and
(3) registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1483 (6th ed. 1990).
270
See, e.g., Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 626 (6th Cir.
1998); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. 1999).
271
Martin, supra note 3, at 803.
272
Id. at 813.
273
A majority of the cases highlighted in this Article illustrate this principle.
274
See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001); Elecs. Boutique Holdings
Corp. v. Zuccarini, No. 00-4055, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15719 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2001),
aff’d, No. 01-1476, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9247 (3d Cir. Apr. 25, 2002).
275
See Panavision Int’l LP v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Intermatic, Inc.
v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996).

6-SILBERLIGHT FORMAT

314

12/12/02 4:23 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:269

infringers of a protected mark, further ensuring the defendant’s
demise.
The original provision of the Lanham Act, section 1125(a) of
the United States Code (the statute initially used for domain name
disputes), codified common law trademark infringement claims.276
This section regulates the proper use of trademarks and notes that
“any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof” used in a manner “likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person”277 is a basis for a
trademark infringement claim. Unlike the Lanham Act, however,
the ACPA specifically limits itself to domain names, having no
more general applicability.278
Contrary to what some
commentators may believe,279 there is a difference in analysis
between the bad faith intent to profit under the ACPA and the
likelihood of confusion test. The aforementioned cases rely
primarily on the factors outlined in the ACPA, which is
specifically tailored to domain name disputes; while these cases
could have applied more traditional trademark law, as codified in
the Lanham Act, the claimants found more salient recourse by
using the ACPA and having the court apply the factors therein.
Although the stated purpose of the ACPA was to protect
trademark owners confronted with cybersquatters,280 it appears that
its interpretation has been broadened to protect marks used by
those who lack the mens rea of the stereotypical cybersquatter.281
Perhaps the ACPA’s reach has become too broad and has been
applied beyond the scope of its intended purpose by punishing
domain name registrants who make the unintentional mistake of
276

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
Id.
278
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) (limiting its scope to a person who “registers,
traffics in, or uses a domain name”).
279
See Martin, supra note 29, at 600 (conveying that not only is a bad faith inquiry
“tantamount” to the likelihood of confusion standard, but that “ACPA plaintiffs must
establish a likelihood of confusion even if bringing a claim based solely on a trademark
dilution theory”).
280
See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4 (1999).
281
Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Karpachev, 188 F. Supp. 2d 110, 113–14 (D. Mass.
2002) (finding that the defendant, whose intent was to “tarnish or disparage” the
plaintiff’s mark, was in violation of the ACPA).
277
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obtaining a domain name that includes a protected mark. As
illustrated by the cases highlighted in this Article, however, it
appears that courts are properly applying the ACPA, providing
appropriate deference to the fair use defense, and achieving the
most equitable results. Thus, the ACPA appears not only to have
served its purpose of stopping the evil cybersquatter but has also
provided a fair and just framework for courts to adjudicate domain
name disputes.282
Of course, like any law, the ACPA has not gone unscathed and
isolated from criticism.283 Nonetheless, the ACPA has laid the
framework for consistent interpretation and a somewhat uniform
application, which thereby creates stability for mark owners and
was precisely what mark owners needed from the ACPA.
CONCLUSION
The ACPA was intended for a specific purpose: to rid the
world of the pesky cybersquatter who harmed both protected mark
holders as well as consumers. The ACPA’s bad faith intent to
profit standard is very straightforward and serves as a means to
combat this specific problem. Federal courts, at both the appellate
and the district court level, have applied a uniform interpretation of
the ACPA factors. In certain circumstances, federal courts have
applied, either directly or indirectly, notions of traditional
trademark law in reaching an ultimate determination. The court
decisions discussed in this Article appear to have reached the most
equitable results, while taking into account both parties’ claims to
rights in particular names.
282

See supra notes 6–7, 11, 18–21, 23.
See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 9 (noting various criticisms of the APCA from
various sources); Kevin Eng, Breaking Through the Looking Glass: An Analysis of
Trademark Rights in Domain Names Across Top Level Domains, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 7, 77–78 (2000) (describing the ACPA as “a formidable federal weapon, the use of
which can lead to results as coercive as cybersquatting itself” as it strengthens “large
companies’ already superior positions, [and] weakens smaller companies’ positions”);
Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil
Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 882–85 (2000) (making
observations about the ACPA, e.g., the title is “entertaining,” the law is “too much and
too late,” and “goes too far”).
283
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The ACPA has become a productive law that has been
followed and interpreted in the same manner for which it was
intended.
An examination of the highlighted case law
demonstrates that substantial deviation from current interpretation
seems unlikely. The ACPA was the congressional answer to
problems associated with cybersquatters, and as seen by most of
the examples in this Article, has been adequate. Most importantly,
the type of behavior the ACPA sought to deter has been effectively
controlled.

